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I. INTRODUCTION

The family limited partnership (FLP)' is a popular estate planning tool used by practitioners to reduce estate taxes. 2 If an FLP
1. Although a family limited partnership is not a recognized legal entity, every state
recognizes limited partnerships as valid legal entities. REV. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 101
(amended 1985). In Pennsylvania, a family limited partnership is formed by executing and
filing a certificate of limited partnership with the Pennsylvania Secretary of State. See 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8511 (West Supp. 2008).

225

226

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 46

is formed under the right circumstances 3 and composed of the
right assets, 4 a taxpayer who holds a significant portion of his assets therein may have his gross estate taxed at a reduced rate due
to valuation discounts for lack of control and marketability of his
FLP interests. 5 As a result, many wealthy taxpayers have taken
up this tax-saving offer and have allowed their family practitioners to incorporate an FLP into their estate plans. The following
illustration will show the tax-saving effect of the valuation discounts that the FLP has to offer: Taxpayer A does not hold any of
his assets in an FLP. If he dies in 2007 with $4 million in assets,
his estate will be required to pay $780,800 in taxes.6 On the other
hand, Taxpayer B transfers an identical $4 million in assets into
an FLP in exchange for a limited partnership interest. When
Taxpayer B also dies in 2007, his estate will be required to pay
substantially less in, or perhaps even be exempted from, estate
taxes after receiving discounts for lack of control and marketability of his FLP interests. 7 How is this accomplished? If Taxpayer
B claims and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) grants a fifty
percent discount for lack of control and marketability, the value of
his estate will be reduced to $2 million. Since an estate valued at
2. Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of DisappearingWealth Revisited: Using Family
Limited Partnershipsto Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, 1 PInT. TAX REV. 155, 155 (2004).
3. An FLP cannot be formed shortly before the imminent death of the party transferring ownership of assets to the entity. When assets are transferred to an FLP shortly before death or after the owner of the assets is mentally incompetent, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) will challenge the legitimacy of the FLP. Erickson v. Comm'r, 93 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1175 (2007).
4. An FLP comprised mainly of cash and marketable securities will not withstand the
scrutiny of the IRS or the courts. Turner v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367 (2004). A decedent will
normally need to transfer legitimate business interests to an FLP in order to stand clear of
the wrath of the IRS. Turner, 382 F.3d at 383.
5. Andrea B. Short, Adequate and Full Uncertainty: Courts' Application of Section
2036(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code to Family Limited Partnerships,84 N.C. L. REV.
694, 702 (2006).
6. Section 2010(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) applies an "applicable
credit amount" of $2 million to persons dying in 2007. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (Supp. V 2005). This
means that a person who dies with an estate valued at $2 million dollars or less will not be
responsible for paying estate taxes. Ifan estate is valued at over $2 million, § 2001(c) supplies the rates at which these estates will be taxed. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (Supp. V 2005). An
estate valued at $2 million after the application of the "applicable credit amount" is taxed
at a marginal rate of forty-five percent.
7. Normally when a person transfers his or her assets to an FLP, he or she receives
both general and limited partnership interests in exchange for the transfer of assets. These
interests are normally discounted due to lack of control and marketability because "a willing buyer would pay less for the limited partnership interest than the underlying assets are
actually worth." Short, supra note 5, at 702. See also Bradford Updike, Making Sense of
Family Limited PartnershipLaw After Strangi and Stone: A Better Approach to Planning
and Litigation Through the Bona Fide TransactionException, 50 S.D. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2005).

Winter 2008

Cutting the Strings

$2 million dollars or less will not be subject to the Federal Estate
Tax, 8 Taxpayer B will not have to pay any estate taxes. The
valuation discount available for Taxpayer B is not available for
Taxpayer A, whose assets have virtually the same economic value,
but does not hold them in an FLP.
The obvious discrepancy that exists between Taxpayer A and
Taxpayer B has not gone unnoticed by the IRS. Over the past
decade, 9 the IRS has used a particular section of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) to successfully disallow valuation discounts
that have been claimed, not because of the substance of the assets,
but because of the form in which the taxpayer holds the assets.
This Code section, 2036(a), also referred to as a "string provision,"'10 is used by the IRS to effectively tax the assets that the
estate attempted to avoid through valuation discounts by pulling
the value of these assets back into the taxpayer's gross estate.
To begin, the Code imposes a graduated tax on "the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United
States."" A decedent's taxable estate is defined by the Code as
"the value of the gross estate" minus deductions.12 The gross estate includes "the value of all property to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death."'13 Property that a
decedent is considered to have an "interest therein" 14 includes any
real estate, personal property, life insurance policies, or monetary
assets that the decedent owns or has the right to transfer at his
death. 15 The Code also contains "string provisions,"'16 which are
used to pull certain assets a decedent has transferred before death
back into his gross estate. "The common theme is a lifetime transfer by the decedent that had a string attached such that the prop-

8. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (Supp. V 2005).
9. For the first time, in 1997, the IRS was successful in convincing the Tax Court that
§ 2036(a) of the Code should be used to disallow valuation discounts of the assets sheltered
by an FLP. Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2858 (1997). This
Code section will be discussed in detail throughout this comment.
10. Kleinrock's TaxExpert Analysis and Explanation § 752.8 (2005), available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com. Three sections of the I.R.C.--§§ 2036, 2037 and 2038-are
considered string provisions. Id. If any of these three provisions applies to the decedent's
property, then the value of that property will be included in the gross estate and subject to
federal estate taxation. Id.
11. I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2000).
12. Id. § 2051.
13. Id. § 2033.
14. Id.
15. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (2007).
16. See supra note 10.
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erty carries with it the potential of returning it to the [decedent]
17
or to the [decedent's] estate."
One of these so-called "string provisions" that has proven to be
very beneficial in the IRS's fight against taxpayers claiming
valuation discounts for FLP interests is § 2036(a) of the Code.
This section states:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in the case of
a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in
fact end before his death: (1) the possession or enjoyment of,
or right to the income from, the property or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom. 18
Section 2036(a) "addresses the concern that inter vivos transfers
often function as will substitutes, with the transferor continuing
to enjoy the benefits of his property during life, and the beneficiary receiving the property only upon the transferor's death." 19
Consequently, § 2036(a)(1) pulls the value of all of the property
transferred during the decedent's life into his gross estate if he
"retains possession, enjoyment, or the right to income from the
property during his lifetime." 20 In other words, while the form in
which the decedent's assets are held is different than if he owned
the assets outright, his ability to use the assets is virtually identical.
Section 2036(a) provides an exception for situations where the
decedent's transfer of the assets was a "bona fide sale for adequate
and full consideration." 21 Under particular circumstances, even if
the decedent retains possession, control, or enjoyment of the assets that he transferred during life, the decedent will not have the
17. Kleinrock, supra note 10, § 752.8 (2005).
18. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
19. Turner v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 375 (3d. Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Grace,
395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969) ("[T]he general purpose of the statute was to include in a decedent's gross estate transfers that are essentially testamentary.")).
20. Turner, 382 F.3d at 375.
21. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
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value of these assets taxed as part of his gross estate if the IRS, or
the appropriate court, finds that the transfer was a "bona fide sale
made for adequate and full consideration." 22 However, this exception has been the center of much confusion due to the fact that
many courts have created different requirements for what is considered to be a "bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration." 23 The remainder of this comment focuses upon the Third
Circuit's definition of a "bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration" and why this definition may be problematic for a practitioner forming an FLP for a taxpayer who is subject to Pennsyl24
vania law.

II. ANALYSIS
A.

Family Limited Partnershipsin Pennsylvania

In Pennsylvania, an FLP is formed when two or more family
members file a certificate of limited partnership with the Pennsylvania Department of State Corporation Bureau. 25 The FLP is
comprised of both general partners and limited partners. 26 The
general partners 27 have all of the control of the FLP, but receive
very little economic benefit from their partnership interests. 28 On
the other hand, the limited partners have limited control over the
partnership affairs, but usually transfer most of the assets to the
partnership and receive most of the economic benefits from the

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Turner, 382 F.3d at 375.
25. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8511 (West Supp. 2008). While it is not necessary to
name the limited partners in the Certificate of Limited Partnership, all of the general partners must be named therein. Id. Pennsylvania also requires other provisions of the limited
partnership agreement to be in writing; otherwise the statutory default provisions will
apply. Id. These provisions include: (1) rules governing the admission of general partners,
id. § 8531; (2) allocation of profits and losses among partners and classes of partners, id. §
8543; (3) distribution of cash or other assets among partners and classes of partners, 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8544 (West 1995); (4) rules governing the voluntary withdrawal of
limited partners, id. § 8553; and (5) rules governing distribution in kind from the partner-

ship, id. § 8555.
26. Short, supra note 5, at 700.
27. Id. at 701. The family that forms the FLP will normally form a corporation that
acts as the general partner of the FLP. Id. Members of the family will then hold controlling interests in the corporate general partner so that they are still in control of the actions
of the FLP. Id.
28. Id. General partners have more rights and responsibilities regarding the control of
the corporation and are fully liable for the acts of the partnership. Id.
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FLP. 29 All of the partners in an FLP are either members of the
same family or controlled by members of the same family. 30
B.

Disallowanceof Valuation Discounts Based upon § 2036(a) of
the Code

The creation of an FLP normally involves a senior generation
taxpayer transferring a substantial amount of his assets to the
FLP in exchange for limited partnership and general partnership
interests. 3 1 The following example will illustrate the formation of
a typical FLP and the way in which the IRS disallows valuation
discounts with the use of § 2036(a) of the Code. 32 Taxpayer transfers $3 million, approximately ninety-five percent of his total assets, to an FLP in exchange for a ninety-five percent limited partnership interest. During his lifetime, distributions of cash are
made to Taxpayer from the FLP. Taxpayer also gives gifts of
partnership interests to his children, which are recorded as reductions in Taxpayer's FLP partnership capital account.
When Taxpayer dies, the FLP contains a total of $2.5 million as
a result of the distributions and gifts made during his lifetime.
However, in filing Taxpayer's Federal Estate Tax Return, his executor values his ninety-five percent partnership interest at a
mere $1.25 million. The executor claims the value of Taxpayer's
interest in the FLP should be given this fifty percent discount because Taxpayer only holds a ninety-five percent limited partnership interest, which causes his interest to lack control 33 and mar34
ketability.
The IRS counters with the argument that this discount should
be disallowed. Since Taxpayer received income from and main29. Id.
30. Lauren E. Bishow, Issues in the Third Circuit:Death and Taxes: The Family Limited Partnershipand its use in Estate PlanningAfter the Third Circuit's Ruling in Estate of
Thompson v. Commissioner, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2005).
31. Updike, supra note 7, at 7.
32. This illustration is a simplified version of the facts in Turner v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d
367, 375 (2004).
33. Because the limited partner has essentially no control over the management of the
FLP, the IRS allows a twenty to forty percent discount for such nominal interests. Bishow,
supra note 30, at 1191 n.56 ("[A] lack of control over management results in a lack of control over the asset contributed to the FLP which includes an inability to influence decisions
related to the asset's disposition." (citing DAVID T. LEWIS & ANDREA C. CHOMAKOS, THE
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP DESKBOOK: FORMING AND FUNDING FLPS AND
CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ENTITIES 11 (2004))).

OTHER

34. An FLP interest is discounted for its lack of marketability because it is normally
difficult to find a third party willing to purchase an interest in a closely-held family partnership. Bishow, supranote 30, at 1190.
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tained control over the FLP by giving gifts to his children, §
2036(a) of the Code includes the entire $3 million that Taxpayer
originally transferred to the FLP in the gross estate. Consequently, instead of being exempt from estate taxation because the
value of his interest in the FLP is less than $2 million dollars, 35
Taxpayer's estate will be taxed at a rate over forty percent. Under
these circumstances the IRS will prevail, and Taxpayer's estate
plan employing the FLP to shelter his assets will be defeated.
The above result, however, could have been avoided if Taxpayer's FLP had been set up to avoid the traps the IRS has set for
creative, yet imperfect, estate plans. Turner v. Commissioner36 is
the key case that a practitioner must use to determine how to
safely structure a Pennsylvania taxpayer's FLP in order to avoid
its inclusion in the gross estate. The most important aspect of the
Turner decision is the Third Circuit's interpretation of what type
of transaction will be considered a "bona fide sale for adequate and
full consideration." 37 If a decedent transfers his assets to an FLP
as part of a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration
then, even if he "retain[s] . . . possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property, or the right . . . to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom," 38 the decedent will not have the value of his
interest in the FLP included in his gross estate.
C.

Third CircuitInterpretation: Turner v. Commissioner

In Turner, when Theodore R. Thompson died in 1995 he had
approximately $89,000 in liquid assets, a majority interest in two
limited partnerships (Thompson Partnership and Turner Partnership), and shares in the two corporations that served as the general partners of the two limited partnerships. 39 The decedent's
taxable estate, as calculated by his executors, was valued at
$1,761,219.40 This value was derived after the estate applied a
forty percent discount to the value of the FLP interests due to lack
41
of control and marketability.
35. See supra note 6.
36. 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004). This case has also been cited by various courts and
secondary sources with the caption "Thompson v. Comm'r."
37. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
38. Id.
39. Turner, 382 F.3d at 372.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 369.
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The IRS rejected the estate's valuation discount and adjusted
the value of the decedent's taxable estate to $3,203,506.42 Underlying the IRS's adjustment of the value of the taxable estate was
the argument that "the full fair market value of the assets transferred by the decedent to the Turner and Thompson Partnerships
should be returned to the decedent's gross estate under § 2036(a)
of the [Code] because [Thompson] retained control and enjoyment
over the transferred assets during his lifetime." 43 The Tax Court
sustained this argument 44 and held that § 2036(a) of the Code applied and returned the assets that Thompson transferred to the
two FLPs back to his gross estate. 45 The Third Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court's decision, concluding that Thompson retained lifetime control and enjoyment of the assets and that his transfer of
the assets to the two FLPs did not fit within the "bona fide sale for
46
adequate and full consideration" exception.
Paramount to the Third Circuit's conclusion was the court's
unique interpretation of the "bona fide sale" exception and what
must be exchanged in order for a transfer to be "for adequate and
full consideration." 47 A discussion of the details surrounding the
creation and operation of Thompson's two FLPs is necessary to
understand the court's decision to include the full value of the assets transferred to the FLPs in Thompson's gross estate and why
the Third Circuit's interpretation of the "bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration" was crucial to this decision.
1.

Creationand Operationof the Turner and Thompson
FLPs

Thompson created the two limited partnerships on April 21,
1993; the Turner Partnership was formed with his daughter, and
the Thompson Partnership was formed with his son. 48 Thompson
transferred $1,286,000 in marketable securities and real estate to
the Turner Partnership in exchange for a 95.4% limited partner-

42. Id. at 372. This increase in the value of the taxable estate resulted in a $707,054
deficiency in Thompson's federal estate taxes.
43. Id. at 373.
44. Estate of Thompson v.Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (2002).
45. Turner,382 F.3d at 373.
46. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
47. Id.
48. Turner, 382 F.3d at 370. On the same day, Thompson also created the Turner
Corporation, in which he held a forty-nine percent interest, to serve as a general partner of
the Turner Partnership. Id.
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ship interest. 49 Similarly, Thompson contributed $1,118,500 in
securities and $293,000 in notes receivable in exchange for a
62.27% limited partnership interest in the Thompson Partnership. 50
While the Turner Partnership participated in several small
business transactions, none of these transactions resulted in any
profit for the partnership. Low interest loans were also made to
members of the Turner family. However, the interest payments
were frequently late or never paid, and the Turner Partnership
never enforced the terms of these loan agreements. 51 The sole
business transaction entered into by the Thompson Partnership
did not result in any economic gain for the members of the partnership. This transaction was the operation of a Colorado ranch,
for which the Thompson Partnership actually claimed losses on its
tax returns for the years 1993 through 1996.52
2.

The Third Circuit'sApplication of § 2036(a) to the
Thompson and Turner Partnerships

The Third Circuit, after scrutinizing the formation and operation of the Turner and Thompson Partnerships, held that the entire value of the assets that Thompson transferred to the two
FLPs in 1993 should be taxed as a part of his gross estate under §
2036(a) of the Code. Consequently, the value of Thompson's gross
estate was increased from $1,761,219-the value with the estate's
discounts for lack of control and marketability-to $2,939,863. 53
The court held that § 2036(a) applied to return the value of the
lifetime transfer made to the two FLPs to Thompson's gross estate
because "there was an ...implied agreement that ... [he would]
retain lifetime possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from,
the transferred property." 54 Furthermore, the Third Circuit held
that the two FLPs did not qualify for the exception to § 2036(a)
"because neither the Thompson Partnership nor Turner Partner-

49. Id.
50. Id. The Thompson Partnership also had a corporate general partner, created on
April 30, 1993, in which Thompson retained a forty-nine percent interest. Id.
51. Id. at 371.
52. Id.
53. Turner, 382 F.3d at 374. This was the value calculated by the Tax Court, and the
Third Circuit affirmed this amount. Id. at 383. The resulting estate tax deficiency, calculated after deductions for attorney fees and interest expenses, was $240,796. Id. at 374.
54. Id. at 375.
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ship conducted any legitimate business operations, nor provided
decedent with any potential non-tax benefit from the transfers." 55
Fundamental to the Third Circuit's examination of the Turner
and Thompson Partnerships was the finding that there was an
implied 56 agreement between the partners that Thompson, the
transferor of the assets funding the two FLPs, would maintain
control over the two partnerships throughout his life. This finding
was especially important because § 2036(a) pulls assets back into
a decedent's gross estate only if the decedent made an inter vivos
transfer of the assets but retained either "possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income from, the property, or the right.., to
designate who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom." 57 The facts that Thompson transferred ninety-five
percent of his assets to the two FLPs, did not retain sufficient assets to support his annual living expenses of $57,202, and was
permitted to withdraw assets from the partnerships whenever he
desired, led the court to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the application of § 2036(a) to the assets transferred to the Turner and Thompson Partnerships. 58
3.

The Third Circuit'sDefinition of the "BonaFide Sale for
Full and Adequate Consideration"Exception and Why
that Exception Could Not Apply to Thompson's FLPs

The application of § 2036(a) to the Thompson and Turner Partnerships was not the end of the Third Circuit's analysis of the issue. Assets that are transferred by a decedent during life will not
be "returned to the gross estate if the transfer constitutes a 'bona
fide sale for adequate and full consideration."'' 59 Consequently, the
Third Circuit was obligated to flesh out exactly what constitutes a
"bona fide sale" and what will be considered "adequate and full
consideration" in such a sale. The Third Circuit's final interpretation of the exception ultimately led the court to hold that Thompson's transfer of almost $3 million in marketable securities to the

55. Id. at 383.
56. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1960) ("An interest or right is treated as having
been retained or reserved if at the time of transfer there was an understanding, express or
implied, that the interest or right would later be conferred.").
57. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
58. Turner, 382 F.3d at 376-77.
59. Id. at 378 (citing I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000)) (emphasis added).
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two FLPs was not saved from gross estate inclusion by the excep-

tion.

60

First, the court discussed what it means to transfer assets for
consideration and why the formation and operation of the Turner
and Thompson Partnerships did not fit that definition. One of the
most significant factors in determining that there was no transfer
for consideration in this case was the fact that the two FLPs did
not engage in any "valid, functioning business enterprise." 61 What
Thompson truly sought to achieve by transferring ninety-five percent of his assets to the FLPs was to change the form in which he
held title to the assets. The failure of Thompson to change the
"underlying pool of assets or prospect for profit" resulted in a mere
"recycling of value" of his assets, which the Tax Court has held not
62
to be a transfer for purposes of § 2036(a).
Moreover, the fact that Thompson made numerous loans to his
daughter and his grandchildren from the FLP assets (loans which
were never repaid) also supported the finding that the purpose of
the FLP was merely to hold title to his property in a more taxefficient form. The court stated that these lending activities
"lacked any semblance of business transactions" and were "testamentary in nature" because Thompson was using his FLP assets
"as a source of financing for the needs of individual family mem63
bers, not for business purposes."
Also significant to the finding that there was no transfer for
purposes of § 2036(a) was the fact that the Turner Partnership
agreement directed that all income, "including any appreciation
realized in the sale of such assets," derived from the partnership's real estate assets shall be paid to the partner contributing
those assets. This aspect of the agreement "denied [Thompson]
any non-tax benefit potentially derived from the assets collected in
65
the partnership."
Finally, the amount of real estate held by the two partnerships
was miniscule. While the estate might have had a better chance
supporting its argument that the FLPs were involved in legitimate
business operations if there were more real estate transactions
involved, the fact that the two FLPs were comprised mainly of
60. Id. at 383.
61. Id. at 379.
62. Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1653 (2002).
63. Turner, 382 F.3d at 380 (quoting Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH)
374, 388 (2002)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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marketable securities obliterated this argument. The Third Circuit noted that "[o]ther than favorable estate tax treatment resulting from the change in form, it is difficult to see what benefit could
be derived from holding an untraded portfolio of securities in this
66
[FLP] with no ongoing business operations."
As to the question of whether the transfer was for "adequate
and full consideration," the Third Circuit noted that "[i]n one
sense, claiming an estate tax discount on assets received in exchange for an inter vivos transfer should defeat the section
2036(a) exception outright." 6 7 In order to claim a discount for lack
of control and marketability, one necessarily must argue that the
interest that he possesses is worth less than the actual economic
value of the interest. However, in the case of an FLP, the party
arguing that the fair market value of his interest is less than its
actual economic value due to lack of control and marketability is
the party who originally transferred the assets into the FLP. This
essentially defeats any argument that the transfer could have
been for full and adequate consideration because the assets are
willingly transferred in exchange for other assets of lesser value
and, in doing so, "the decedent has not replenished the estate with
68
other assets of equal value."
While the Third Circuit refused to hold that any transfer of
marketable securities to an FLP would automatically disqualify
that interest from application of the § 2036(a) exception, the majority did state that such a massive dissipation of a decedent's
gross estate requires "heightened scrutiny into the actual substance of the transaction."6 9 FLPs, such as the Thompson and
Turner Partnerships, that do not operate any legitimate business
and appear merely to be freezing liquid assets by forcing them into
a limited partnership will not withstand this heightened scrutiny.
Next on the Third Circuit's agenda was to declare yet another
reason why the Thompson and Turner Partnerships could not
qualify for the exception to § 2036(a). Along with the requirement
that the inter vivos transferor must receive "full and adequate
consideration" in exchange for his assets is the condition that this

66. Id.
67. Id. at 381.
68. Turner, 382 F.3d at 381 ("[U]nless a transfer that depletes the transferor's estate is
joined with a transfer that augments the estate by a commensurate (monetary) amount,
there is no 'adequate and full consideration' for the purposes of either the estate or gift tax."
(quoting Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 762 (5th Cir. 1997))).
69. Id.
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transfer be a "bona fide sale." 70 While the Tax Court concluded
that Thompson's inter vivos transfers were not "bona fide sales"
because of the absence of an "arm's length transaction," 71 the
Third Circuit found Thompson's transfers inadequate for another
reason. 72 According to the court, a "'bona fide sale' only requires 'a
sale in which the decedent/transferor actually parted with her interest in the assets transferred and the partnership/transferee
actually parted with the partnership interest issued in exchange."' 73 While evidence of an "arm's length transaction" would
be most persuasive to a finding of a "bona fide sale," the fact that
Thompson stood on one side of the transaction as the transferor of
assets and on the other side of the transaction as a limited partner
was not enough for the Third Circuit to find the absence of a "bona
fide sale."
What is more important in the determination of whether a
transaction constitutes a "bona fide sale" is whether the transfer is
made in "good faith." 74 This good faith requirement stands for the
notion that a transfer to an FLP must "provide the transferor
some potential for benefit other than the potential estate tax advantages that might result from holding assets in partnership
form. '76 Because neither the Turner nor the Thompson Partnership provided Thompson with any discernable non-tax benefits,
the Third Circuit found that Thompson's transfer of assets to the
two FLPs was not made in "good faith" and thereby was not a
candidate for the "bona fide sale" exception to § 2036(a) of the
Code.

70. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
71. Turner, 382 F.3d at 381. The fact that Thompson stood on both sides of the transaction-as the transferor of assets and as a limited partner of the two FLPs-eliminated
any chances of the transaction being at "arm's length." See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r,
84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (2002).
72. The Third Circuit noted that
neither the [IRC] nor the governing Treasury Regulations define "bona fide
sale" to include an "arm's length transaction." Treasury Regulation 20.20361(a) defines "bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration" as a transfer
made "in good faith" and for a price that is "[an] adequate and full equivalent
reducible to a money value."
Id. at 382 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1960) and quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(a)
(1958)).
73. Id. (quoting Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004)).
74. Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(a) (1958).
75. Turner, 382 F.3d at 383.
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How to Avoid the Application of Turner to your FLP

While the Third Circuit's decision in Turner does not eliminate
the possibility of using an FLP to achieve a tax-saving estate
plan, 76 there are certain precautions that must be used to properly
create and maintain an FLP in order to avoid the heavy hand of
the Third Circuit. The most important consideration for structuring an FLP is the fact that courts are no longer recognizing FLPs
supported 7solely
by an argument of form over substance. 77 A mere
"recycling" 8 of assets through an exchange of personal assets for
limited and general partnership interest in the same assets, without any true investment scheme or any change in the use and en79
joyment of the assets, will not pass muster in the Third Circuit.
What a taxpayer truly needs in order to take full advantage of the
80
valuation discounts offered to FLPs are non-taxation motives.
This eliminates the practitioner's ability to mindlessly transfer a
client's assets into an FLP in order to achieve instant estate tax
benefits.
Although the decision in Turner has proven that "the good-old
days of using FLPs to save on taxes and also to retain total control

76. "Despite its more suitable purposes, many unwary legal and financial practitioners
have applauded the FLP as a strategy that allows older generation taxpayers to keep total
control of their assets and to achieve multi-million dollar estate tax savings." Updike,
supranote 7, at 1
77. The IRS shudders at the very thought of a triumph of form over substance. See
Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Economic Substance in the Context of Federal Estate and Gift
Tax: The Internal Revenue Service Has It Wrong, 64 MONT. L. REV. 389, 389-90 (2003). In
order for a transfer to be considered legitimate for the purpose of federal taxation, there
must be some economic substance to the transaction other than the fact that the transfer
will effectuate tax savings. Id. at 390.
78. The Turner court held that when an FLP is not "engaged in any valid, functioning
business enterprise" and it is clear that the transfer of assets to an FLP was only a "recycling of value" of the assets, there will be "no transfer for consideration within the meaning
of § 2036(a)." Turner, 382 F.3d at 378-79.
79. The Third Circuit is not the only court that has upheld the IRS's argument that §
2036(a) applies to return the assets transferred to an FLP back into the estate of the transferor. See Strangi v. Comm'r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005); Estate of Abraham v. Comm'r,
408 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2005); Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855
(1997) (all favorable to the IRS).
80. Turner repeatedly emphasized the fact that in order to have a transfer of assets
during life that will fit perfectly into the mold of § 2036(a)'s exception, the decedent must
have transferred his assets in"good faith." Turner, 382 F.3d at 383.
A "good faith" transfer to a family limited partnership must provide the transferor some potential estate tax advantages that might result from holding assets in partnership form. Even when all the "i's are dotted and t's are crossed,"
a transaction motivated solely by tax planning and with "no business or corporate purpose.., is nothing more than a contrivance."
Id. (quoting Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
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over family assets are gone forever," 81 there are still ways to make
beneficial use of an FLP. Imperative to the estate practitioner's
decision of whether to present an FLP to a client as an estate
planning vehicle will be a consideration of the following factors:
the type of assets held by the client,8 2 the value of the assets the
client wishes to protect from taxation, 83 the amount of control the
client wishes to relinquish,8 4 and the underlying business and investment schemes that the client's assets may be used to

achieve. 85
Even when all of the aforementioned factors are properly considered, the key element to achieving estate tax benefits through
the use of an FLP is the motivation underlying its creation.
Turner made it clear that in order to qualify for the "bona fide
sale" exception to § 2036(a), a transfer must be made in "good
faith."8 6 Remember that this "good faith" requirement does not
eliminate the ability to create an FLP with family members as the
sole limited and general partners. 87 What it does require, however, is "a sale in which the decedent/transferor actually parted
with [his] interest in the assets transferred and the partner-

81. Updike, supra note 7, at 4.
82. When the FLP is comprised predominantly of marketable securities and there is no
active management of the portfolio of securities, an estate will be hard-pressed to make the
argument that a legitimate business enterprise existed at the creation and during the
management of the FLP. Turner, 382 F.3d at 380.
83. The assets that the taxpayer retains after transferring a large portion of his wealth
to an FLP are important to creating an FLP that is legitimate in the eyes of the Third Circuit. If a decedent cannot "live comfortably without resorting to the transferred assets,"
then the court will see through the transaction as a mere recycling of value. Short, supra
note 5, at 730.
84. The court will be more likely to find that there is a legitimate non-tax purpose
supporting an FLP if the decedent who transferred a majority of the assets to the FLP gives
up control of his assets. In Turner, although the Thompson and Turner Partnership
agreements did not contain any provision that Thompson would maintain control over his
transferred assets, his "de jure lack of control over the transferred property [did] not defeat
the [court's] inference of an implied agreement in these circumstances." Turner, 382 F.3d
at 376. 'The Tax Court recognized that although 'some change ensued in the formal relationship of [Thompson] to the assets he contributed to the partnership . . . [the] practical
effect of these changes during [Thompson's] life was minimal." Id. (quoting Thompson, 84
T.C.M. at 387). There was even testimony from family members that "they would not have
refused [Thompson's] request for ... [annual] distributions." Id. at 377.
85. The most important aspect of the Third Circuit's disqualification of Thompson's
transfers for the exception to § 2036(a) was the fact that neither the Thompson nor the
Turner Partnership conducted any legitimate business operation. Turner, 382 F.3d at 383.
86. Id.
87. "[J]ust because a transaction takes place between family members does not impose
an additional requirement not set forth in the statute to establish that it is bona fide."
Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 263 (citing Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 764 (5th Cir.
1997)).
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ship/transferee actually parted with the partnership interest issued in exchange."88
In order to meet this requirement, evidence must be presented
that, after the FLP was formed, the partners acted in conformity
with corporate formalities, and income distributions from the FLP
were made in a manner consistent with the partnership agreement.8 9 If it is clear from the operation of the FLP that "the entire
family really intended in good faith to pool their assets and services in a common enterprise," 90 then the "good faith" requirement
will most likely be met. For example, the fact that Thompson contributed nearly all of the assets held by the Thompson and Turner
Partnerships and received substantial limited partnership interests in return was not the fatal factor in the Third Circuit's determination that all of the assets he transferred would be returned
to his gross estate. Instead, the court's conclusion was based upon
the facts that there was no legitimate pooling of all of the assets of
the family member partners, that there was no effort to invest the
funds for the benefit of the FLP, and that the partners' relationships to the funds that they contributed to the FLP did not
change. 91
In the absence of any United States Supreme Court decision interpreting § 2036(a) or a Code section explicitly applying special
valuation rules to FLPs, estate practitioners must struggle to conform their Pennsylvania client's FLP to the mold set by the Third
Circuit in Turner. On the other hand, practitioners could also
slyly choose to dodge the stringent test set forth in Turner and
successfully receive valuation discounts for lack of control and
marketability from the Commissioner of the IRS. However, this
does not always mean that the client's gross estate will escape
without a scratch, for the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue
(Department) has proven itself to be just as stringent in its attack
92
against FLPs.

88. Turner, 382 F.3d at 382 (quoting Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 265).
89. Updike, supra note 7, at 21. Note that in Turner, the family members amended one
of the partnership agreements "to allocate all gains and losses from, and distribution of real
estate contributed to the partnership, to the individual contributing partner." Turner, 382
F.3d at 380. This type of income distribution is repugnant to the argument that a legitimate business operation exists because the decedent, or anyone else for that matter, has
not changed his relationship to the assets he contributed to the FLP. See Updike, supra
note 7, at 22.
90. Updike, supra note 7, at 22.
91. Turner, 382 F.3d at 378-80.
92. In re Estate of Berry, 921 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
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III. THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE'S USE OF
TURNER TO DISALLOW VALUATION DISCOUNTS FOR PURPOSES OF
THE PENNSYLVANIA INHERITANCE TAX

Even the IRS will sometimes overlook the savvy estate practitioner's formation of an FLP that does not fit within the exception
to § 2036(a) and allow generous valuation discounts for a lack of
control and marketability. 93 This does not, however, free the estate from scrutiny by the Department for determination of the
amount of Pennsylvania inheritance taxes owed. 94 An example of
this exceptionally strict review by the Pennsylvania courts oc95
curred in April 2007.
In January 1998, Helen H. Berry contributed $6,783,593 in cash
and marketable securities to the HJL Family Limited Partnership
(HJL) in exchange for a one percent general partnership interest
and a ninety-seven percent limited partnership interest. 96 Then,
in June of the same year, Berry transferred the assets into a revocable trust for her sole benefit with the ability to "withdraw all or
97
any part of the income and principal at any time."
Berry's executor submitted a federal estate tax return to the
IRS with a thirty-three percent discount for lack of control and
marketability of HJL. 98 However, the Department disallowed
such a discount, and the Estate appealed to the Department Board
of Appeals (Board) and the Venango County Orphans' Court, 99
both of which refused to overturn the Department's disallowance
of the valuation discounts. 100 The Board found, and the trial court
agreed, "given the nature of the partnership, its members, and its
assets, the Estate failed to demonstrate that a partner, not compelled to sell, would have disposed of his interest at a discount." 10 1
The Estate then appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
While there are no Department rules or regulations applicable
02
to FLPs, the Department, as part of its statutorily authorized
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
did not

101.

Berry, 921 A.2d at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1261.
Berry, 921 A.2d at 1262.
Court of Common Pleas of Venango County, O.C.D. No. 34 (2006).
Berry, 921 A.2d at 1263. The Venango County Orphans' Court found that the HJL
operate as a functioning business enterprise. Id.

Id.

102. Section 9121 of the Pennsylvania Inheritance and Estate Tax Act (Act) states "[t]he
value of a life interest shall be determined in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the department. Until the promulgation of rules and regulations to the con-
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course of action, looked to the provisions of the Code to determine
whether the valuation discounts should have been applied to
HJL.103 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in step with the
Board and the trial court, also used federal estate tax considerations in making its determination of whether to affirm the deci04
sion below. 1
Central to the court's determination of whether the "HJL was a
legitimate business enterprise, rather than merely a taxavoidance mechanism, ' 1°5 was an analysis of § 2036(a) of the
Code. Because Berry retained "both the possession of, and the
right to income from, the assets of the HJL trust,"'0 6 the court
held that the only way in which the entire value of the HJL partnership could escape taxation as part of Berry's gross estate would
be if there was a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. 107 The HJL, however, did not meet the exception to §
2036(a). The court held, relying on the Third Circuit's decision in
Turner, that since the partnership "did not engage in 'any valid,
functioning business enterprise... and because Berry "continued
after the transfer of assets to the partnership, 'to be the principal
economic beneficiary of the contributed property,"' the HJL could
not fit within the bona fide sale exception to § 2036(a).10 8
The Commonwealth Court's strict application of the Third Circuit's decision in Turner makes it clear that estate practitioners
are going to have to conform their clients' FLPs to the "legitimate
business interest-bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration-good faith" framework in order to properly effectuate their
clients' estate plans. Additionally, the fact that the Pennsylvania
Department of Revenue is, in some instances, scrutinizing FLPs
even more closely than the IRS should send a clear signal to prac-

trary, the regulation in effect for Federal estate tax purposes shall apply." 72 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 9121(b) (West 2000).
103. The fact that the IRS allowed the valuation discount was not dispositive of the
value of the estate for purposes of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax. Berry, 921 A.2d at
1263. Section 9137 of the Act states that "[tihe Department shall have supervision over,
and make or cause to be made, fair and conscionable appraisements of property." 72 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 9137 (West 2000). Also, "[tihere is no statutory or common-law authority for
the proposition that the Department or [a Commonwealth] Court is bound by an assessment of the I.R.S. when considering the correct assessment of Pennsylvania inheritance
tax." Berry, 921 A.2d at 1263.
104. Berry, 921 A.2d at 1263-64.
105. Id. at 1263.
106. Id. at 1264.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Turner,382 F.3d at 376, 379).
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titioners that the days of creating illegitimate FLPs to shelter
their clients' estates from taxes are over.
III. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's decision regarding the proper formation and
maintenance of an FLP gives anything but a straightforward
guide to a practitioner who wants to be sure that he protects his
clients' assets from excessive federal estate taxation. The fact that
the determination of whether a decedent's estate will be subjected
to millions of dollars more in federal estate taxes is based upon an
evaluation of the "good faith" of the decedent and his family is
quite unnerving. Using a test that is more akin to determining a
taxpayer's mental state can be risky when million-dollar discounts
are on the line and the courts are in favor of the IRS's position.
Clearly, the Third Circuit has taken a zero-tolerance approach in
its examination of an FLP if there is any evidence of the abuse of
valuation discounts.
With this in mind, it is also significant that when the IRS
somehow allows valuation discounts for lack of control and marketability that would otherwise violate the Third Circuit's approach, the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue is quick to disallow those discounts for purposes of determining the Pennsylvania
inheritance tax. What this means for the practitioner creating an
estate plan for a taxpayer within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania
courts is that he must make it clear, in both his formation and
documentation of an FLP, that the taxpayer has a legitimate
business purpose and that the FLP comports with the mold set by
the Third Circuit in Turner. Part of achieving this goal is avoiding
the inappropriate commingling of funds between the general and
limited partners, as well as working to ensure that the FLP is engaging in an activity that has the possibility of being a profitable
enterprise for the holders of the partnership interests. Finally,
practitioners must be sure that the "good faith" requirement is
met by requiring the transferors to actually part with the assets
that they are transferring to the partnership in exchange for a
concrete interest in the partnership being created.
Sara A. Miller

